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FOREWORD
In responding to an invitation to present a paper at
EURO V, the Fifth European Congress on Operations Research,
whose theme is "The Practice of Operations Research," I
proposed a paper under the title "Lessons from Experience
in the Practice of Operations Research" with the following
abstract:
This paper follows the operations research analyst
in his day-to-day work from the ｢ ･ ｧ ｩ ｾ ｮ ｩ ｮ ｧ to the end of
a project, offering him advice based on the experience
of other analysts. Beginning with the awareness of a
problem situation, it discusses formulating the problem,
gathering information about it, formulating alternatives
to be considered for its possible solution, choosing
modes of analysis, carrying out the analysis, formulating
its findings, preparing the communication instruments,
conducting the communication campaign, carrying out
additional analysis of questions arising during this
campaign, and following up on the results of the analysis
and the decisions emerging from it. Owing to the scat-
tered and relatively scarce literature on this subject,
the paper is based largely on its author's experience,
plus the experiences of others known to him.
The original thought was that this paper was to be
extracted from a chapter on practice that I was then writing
for the forthcoming Handbook of Systems Analysis (Edward S.
Quade and Hugh J. Miser, editors). However, since I made
the original proposal, it has seemed more desirable to offer
the entire chapter, provided the reader is willing to grant
two indulgences:
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• Wherever the chapter reads "systems analysis," under-
stand that operations research is also meant.
• Forgive the occasional references to earlier chapters
of the Handbook (which are seldom necessary to the understanding
of the point being made, although they contribute to it).
I have benefited greatly from comments by E. S. Quade,
A. M. Mood, Kenneth Bowen, Gene Fisher, Warren Walker,
Yehezkel Dror, and Robert Specht; however, candor compels me
to admit that I have not always taken their advice, so that
they may not necessarily agree with what I have written.
Laxenburg, Austria
28 June 1982
-iv-
Hugh J. Miser
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CHAPI'ER 10. THE PRACTICE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Hugh J. Miser
1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters of this Handbook have described the context, nature.
and use of systems analysis, sketched its history. given examples of good sys-
tems analysis studies. laid out the methods that such work exhibits, dealt with
the content of a good systems analysis study and how it is evolved, and provided
a perspective on the work of implementing its results. The purpose of this
chapter is to discuss what experience has taught systems analysts about profes-
sional practice. that is, how to approach their work and what relations they
should have with the clients who may use its results.
Thus. while this chapter speaks primarily to analysts, it also speaks to
clients by telling them what sort of professional conduct they may expect from
systems analysts.
Most of the material in the earlier chapters presumes a situation in which
the systems analysts have direct access to officials with relevant responsibilities
. .
and authorities, whether the analysts are employed by the same organization or
not. We make the same assumption in this chapter. In actual fact, the analysts
may be employed by another organization, such as a consulting firm or indepen-
dent institute. such as the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in
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Laxenburg, Austria. The precepts and principles of professional practice as we
discuss them here remain the same for all of these cases; however. the difficul-
ties of communication may change, depending on whether or not the decision-
makers and analysts work in a common administration or different ones,
whether there are a few or many relevant officials, and so on. Since each situa-
tion offers its own characteristic and highly varied properties, there is little gen-
eral guidance to be offered here, beyond the obvious fact that barriers to effec-
tive communication must be removed if systems analysis work is to have impor-
tant effect, as discussed later in this chapter.
While there is literature dealing .with the practice of systems analysis (see.
for example. Agin 1978), it tends to be scattered and somewhat incomplete.
Thus, in writing this chapter I have relied not only on relevant literature but also
my own experience, coupled with that of others relayed to me through personal
contact. Since systems analysis is a young and rapidly spreading field, experi-
ence to come may well supplement and modify what is said here. However. the
reader may rest assured that everything in this chapter has served analysts well
in significant past experience.
2. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
The concept of decision runs through much of the literature of systems
analysis-and, indeed. much of what has been said earlier in this Handbook.
However, this concept seems to imply that whatever needs improvement in a
problem situation can be changed adequately at a single stroke-an oversimplifi-
cation of real life that. while useful for discussion purposes, does not represent
the reality that we live with. particularly with regard to the sorts of large-scale
interactive problems that systems analysis is likely to be called on to address.
Rather, it is perhaps better to consider the more general concept of
change, and to think of systems analysis being called on when there is an appre-
ciation somewhere that change may be desirable. Change may then be achieved
by a single major decision, or it may occur as the result of a complex of smaller
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decisions made in a variety of places in a large institutional structure, but coor-
dinated and informed by the findings of an intelligent, broad approach to the
issue of change. The role of systems analysis then is to provide an important
contribution to this approach.
Perhaps the most basic task of the analyst, on which he should gather infor-
mation from the beginning and of which he should have a well developed appreci-
ation early in his ""ork, is to understand the structure in which change may take
place. If no decisions leading to change are possible, the work may be of absorb-
ing interest, but it will likely be in vain, unless the situation changes. If the deci-
sion setting presents open. opportunities for change, how can the work best be
related to this setting? There is no simple answer to this question-indeed,
much of what this chapter has to say bears on it-but it is one the analyst must
ask early. and keep in his mind throughout his work. as interactions with the
client organization shed more and more light on it. The knowledge accumulated
during the ·work. as relations with the client develop, can-and should-have a
major influence on how the findings are formulated, presented, and followed up.
Archibald (1979), in writing about fire departments, such as the one in Wilming-
ton, Delaware, discussed in section 3.3, puts it this way:
The perspective taken is that of a "change agent" (Le., a manager
of change). The introduction of analysis is expected to change the end
product or service delivered by the fire department. Most likely this
will also mean changes in structure (the organizational system) and in
process (the various methods and procedures employed to deliver the
services). In turn, these changes will require members within. and
perhaps outside. the organization to change their behavior. The
analyst must see the issue not only in terms of solving a particular
technical problem, but more importantly as the creation of cir-
cumstances that will encourage people to change their behavior. In
performing this task, the analyst becomes the change agent.
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Archibald also
.. stresses the importance of thinking about groups of people,
their common motivations, their organizational positions, and their
values as they influence decisionmaking. As the analyst moves from
the model of the problem to the development of programs to achieve
desired results, the importance of who makes the decisions and who
in!luences the decisionmaking process cannot be overstated.
Sound analytical results should be able to stand alone but they do
not. People who make decisions frequently rind themselves in situa-
tions in which the analysis alone is not sutricient to guide decisionmak-
ing. A broad political rationality is likely to guide an individual's deci-
sions more orten than a narrower technical rationality. It political and
managerial views are to be meshed with the specific problem-solving
perspective of the analyst, the analyst needs to have anticipated,
understood and tried to accommodate the values and perspectives of
decisionmakers and the pressures they face.
To this last point an even stronger one can be added: Sometimes it is neces-
sary for the analyst to confront the decision maker with the inadequacy of his
values and perspectives and help him toward more adequate ones. While this
will at best be a role calling for diplomatic tact based on careful thinking and
appropriate evidence, or at worst impossible, it may turn out to -be the most
important contribution the analyst can make.
In any case, accounting for the decision maker's values and perspectives
only at the end of the study. or during implementation, is too late-and, indeed,
may pose insurmountable ditriculties.
Here are some basic questions about the decision setting on which the
analyst should have clear answers, if possible, before he finishes formulating the
problem and begins his work.
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1. What is the nature of the decision setting? Is there a single strong
decisionmaker? Or is the decision setting a pluralistic one, in which there are
many decisionmakers with varying degrees of power and influence, all of whom
must be addressed? It the study is done for an organization, is its span of
responsibility and authority complete with respect to the problem situation
being contemplated, or will the changes needed involve compromise or coalition
with other organizations?
2. What are the important properties of the decision setting? Organiza-
tions, for instance. have widely differing styles of management that usual.lY. have
important effects on the styles of their approaches to change. The personalities
of key persons frequently are major determinants of these styles. The analyst
cannot change an organization's style in a single systems study-although an
_association involving effective work over a period can lead to changes ｩ ｲ ｩ ｳ ｾ ｹ ｬ ･ Ｍ ｳ ｯ
he is well advised to adapt his work to it to a reasonable extent; he will have diffi-
culty enough in promoting the changes that emerge from his work as desirable
without assuming the added burden of trying to change the organization's style
at a. single stroke.
3. What constraints does the decision setting offer? The most basic and
frequently encountered one is time: Can the systems analysis be completed in
time to inform the decisions leading to change? If it cannot, there is little point
in embarking on it; it" it can.-but only on a simplified and reduced scale, the
analyst and the executives involved must consider whether or not such a
"quick-and-dirty" study can help (in my experience it usually can). Are there
constraints such as customs. policies, laws, or regulations that will affect
change? If so, they may have to be accepted-but surprisingly often they.can be
altered when good reasons appear. Thus, while the analyst must recognize such
constraints. he would be unwise to accord them too sacred a status. It costs lit-
tle to explore a constraint change in many cases, and such an inqUiry can turn
up information about constraints that may make eliminating them appear _to be
desirable.
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4. If. as is usually the case, the work is to be done for an organization,
what is the appropriate administrative level at which the analysis team should
work? There is no simple answer to this question; rather. the proper answer will
differ for each case. depending on many factors. not the least of which is the
personalities and powers of the executives who may be chosen to supply the
main administrative tie during the analysis. Since a problem situation leading to
the need for a systems analysis almost invariably cuts across organizational
lines, both horizontally and vertically. the organization's choice of a sponsoring
executive offers some pitfalls. If he is ambitious and grasping. he may suppress
findings he does not like. or the rest of the organization may resist even obvi-
ously desirable findings to keep him from adding to his span of power and con-
trol; if he is weak and compliant, he may not give the analysis team enough sup-
port to allow them either access to possibly embarrassing information or the
freedom to develop potentially unpopular findings.
5. What is the appropriate relation of the analysis staff to the administra-
tive staff that will have to respond to the study's findings? Can an analysis group
inside the organization be the most effective? Or should an outside group be
employed? Will administrative formalities encumber the work? Will the sources
of support-administrative. financial, and policy-be strong and adequate? Will
these sources of support guarantee the analysis team the free access to infor-
mation that is essential to good analysis? Since the fact that systems analysis is
being contemplated suggests that change may be called for. people in the organ-
ization are almost sure to have mixed feelings about the analysis and the
analysts who are doing it; in the face of this fact. experience teaches that strong
support from the top is essential to a successful outcome.
All of these considerations are embedded in the system structure involved
with the problem situation; the character of this setting has basic importance
for the analyst and how he thinks about the problems and their possible solu-
.
tions. For example, Archibald (1979) describes US fire departments this way'
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Fire service organizations pose special problems and opportuni-
ties tor the manager of change. For example, the quasimilitary
bureaucratic organization of tire departments is a source of resistance
to changes in authority structures, tasks, and procedures; but this
same organizational torm can help expedite compliance with changes
that have been ordered by the chief executive. The traditional single
entry level into the organization is often a source of resistance to
recommendations of people who have not personally experienced tire-
fighting. Knowledge derived from unfamiliar disciplines or n\s.t.a,pt
cities is not readily accepted by fire service personnel.
The change agent must also learn to deal with the crisis orienta-
tion ot fire departments, which focuses rewards on action rather than
on contemplation. The lengthy, sequential decisionrnaking process .o.t
systems analysis contrasts sharply with the drama of decisionmaking
by commanding officers at the scene ot a fire. Moreover, because most
fire departments have not experienced tinancial pressures until recent
years, tire service personnel with budgeting and planning skills are few
in number.
The manager of change must understand how organizations
operate, and be able to view the fire department as a collection of
organizations interacting with other organizations. New policies. that..
arise from deployment analysis are likely to have impacts on other
organizations-such as labor unions and community groups-whose
interests must be considered.
This summary makes it clear that the character of the administrative (as
well as the social and political) structure involved in potential change is impor-
tant. Therefore, the analyst may look for characterizations of such structures
similar to the one quoted above-perhaps one for manufacturing companies,
another' for sales organizations, still another for public service -institutions.
However, experience tells us that this is too much to hope for: There are
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military organizations that are far more informal and unstructured than some
business organizations, and more oriented to problem solution; by the same
token, some businesses are managed by very rigid bureaucracies, while others
have less formal structures easily adapted to change. In sum, the analyst must
make his own observations about the nature of structure and authority for each
organization he deals with, and factor this information into his work.
Much more could be written about how these basic questions about the
organizational context relate to successful systems analysis, but experience is
so varied that on most points it is not possible to be prescriptive. However,
experience does tell us that the questions are important, and that the analyst
must develop ties with the client organization that are close and continuous
enough to enable him to formulate answers to them. These answers, combined
with his experience and reasoned judgement, are then likely to help him find a
path to effective work-or, if he cannot find this path, he has good reasons for
stopping his work before a lot of effort is wasted.
3. AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEM SITUATION
As section 5.1 points out, "the systems analyst, seeking to contribute to
real-world decisions, always finds himself facing, not a well defined problem. but
a problem area or situation: his problem turns out to be a nexus of problems,
what the French call a 'problematique,' or what Ackoff ... calls' a mess.''' While
the manager's view may be incomplete-or even wrong-it can be accepted as a
recognition that all is not well, and that an unsatisfactory posture should be
examined for possible change aimed at improvement.
-- One might conclude that the analyst- should try to get the manager to
sharpen his problem statement. However, experience tells us overwhelmingly
that this is the opposite of what is d.esirable at the beginning: the analyst is well
advised to keep the manager's app,reciation of his problem as broad and general
as possible, so that the early inqUiries into the-situation are free to formulate
the problem (if indeed this is possible) without the inhibiting constraint of
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authoritative misperception. In fact, in my experience, perhaps the worst thing
that can happen is for the executive to write a memorandum stating what the
problem is, particularly if he is a very strong and dominating personality; this
statement then becomes a major deterrent to developing the realistic problem
appreciation needed for good analysis, and makes it doubly hard to get this
appreciation accepted. The moral is plain: At the beginning, keep the discus-
sions and interactions as broad and flexible as possible, to the end that the early
fact finding and analysis can dominate how the problem is formulated.
In sum, there is considerable practical experience backing the view that a
careful problem investigation and formulation effort is an essential beginning:
Chapter 5 provides an approach that can be adapted to most situations. In fact.
to skip or slight this step is to risk spending effort on the wrong problem. The
unhappy cases where this has happened seldom make their way into the litera-
ture, but the oral tradition contains many tales of analysis gone wrong because
the problem investigation was not thorough enough to discover the key diffi-
culty. For example, Agin (1978) describes one case where this could have hap-
pened:
A manager asked for a study to examine the consolidation of three
of his firm's plants into one. The new plant was to be constructed at a
location separate from the three existing plants. A preliminary exami-
nation of the economies which would result from the consolidation-indi-
cated the plants had no operations in common and that the proposed
plan could only result in an increase in costs. The executive should
have known this so that prior to an investigation in detail it was
decided _to review with him what he expected to achieve from the
study. Doing this involved several days of discussion. From this, it was
discovered that the real issue was an inability for this executive and
the union leader at one of the plants to work together. Once this was
recognized, a Vice President of..lndustrial Relations was hired to_ deal
with the union and the idea of consolidation dropped. The undertaking
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of a study with little or no chance for real success was avoided.
Where the initial awareness of the problem situation exists in the organiza-
tion may make considerable difference to how the analysis team proceeds. If
the awareness comes from a high executive, to get an analysis started may be
much easier than if the awareness comes from a subordinate official in an
operating department. If the awareness is forced on the organization by outside
pressures or interventions, the managers may resist change more strongly than
it the perception originated inside. The analysis group itself may be the source
of the perception, since its continuing work sharpens its views. Thus. at the
beginning the analyst may be involved in discussions aimed at persuading
managers that they are facing a problem situation, rather than vice versa. Many
analysts feel that this is one of their most important duties and opportunities.
Certainly, experience tells us that the analysis team that only answers the door-
bell is never as influential or useful as the one that takes a broader and more
entrepreneurial view of its work. In fact, as section 2.2 points out. one of the
earliest perceptions of the operations research community was that. as Blackett
(1950) said of the 1940-45 British experience: "... one of the clearest lessons ...
[is] that -the really big successes of operational research groups are often
achieved by the discovery of problems which had not hitherto been recognized
as significant. In fact the most fertile tasks are often found by the groups them-
selves rather thangiven to them." This view is heavily underlined by operations
research and systems analysis experience in the ensuing four decades.
A systems analysis group may be asked to undertake rather mundane
analysis tasks. If this were the entire menu. the group's purpose in being would
be completely vitiated. However, such tasks should not be shunned entirely:
carefully chosen and done well and promptly, they can often provide entry to
larger and more important work of systems-analytic characte!', both by giving
opportUnities for insights and establishing sympathetic relations with influential
. executives. Further. systems analysts must learn a great deal about theorgani-:- _
zations they serve, and opportunities to further this process have value in their
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own right.
A newly formed systems analysis team is seldom well advised to plunge
right at the beginning into the broadest and most global problems of the organi-
zation it serves. Rather, it should build up its knowledge and the confidence of
the organization through a series of smaller studies; properly chosen and organ-
ized, they can constitute building blocks in the broad understanding that will
support work on the global problems.
Almost anywhere on this scale, however. the analyst looks for these three
characteristics in a problem situation as being harbingers of challenging work:
• A responsible person recognizes a problem situation and wants help.
• The work that appears to be in prospect is functionally interdisciplinary.
that is, it involves more than a single narrow function of the organization.
• The solutions, as well as the problem situation. appear likely to fall out-
side the responsibility of a single small staff organization.
They are not criteria of choice (for example, a single executive may have a
very interesting problem over which he has control that is well worth a systems
analysis effort), but they do suggest properties of a situation that may be partic-
ularly challenging, and therefore particularly appropriate for systems analysis.
Finally, as part of the issue of problem awareness, experience offers some
advice about the management/analyst interactions and initiatives at the begin-
ning: Keep them informal and somewhat fluid. so that the analyst is as free as
possible to consider a variety of possibilities; interact as widely as possible. with
the aim of gaining as varied and comprehensive a picture of the problem situa-
tion as possible before formal work begins. We have noted that it is generally
undesirable for the sponsor to hand the analyst at the beginning of the first dis-
cussion a memorandum stating the problem; it is equally undesirable for the
analyst. right after the first discussion. to retire to his study to prepare a prob-
lem statement in precise terms-he is almost sure to be wrong, and thus eventu-
ally to be embarrassed by his own words as the early fact-finding and analysis
-12 -
probe the problem situation.
4. FORMULATING THE: PROBLEM
The first step to take after the conference with the official who is aware of
the problem situation is to begin a widespread, comprehensive, first-hand. and,
where possible, on-site survey, a thorough background investigation. Chapter 5
provides gUidance on how to approach this activity systematically. This survey
is essential to the analyst's understanding of the situation: the details he discov-
ers here will give him the essential foundation for his later analysis. or course,
the executive most concerned can supply much information of this sort, but
first-hand observation is far more useful than second-hand description. For
example. the analysts who were asked to study the possibility of increasing the
productivity of a third-world steel mill, as described in section 9.3. would have
been well advised to watch all facets of the operation for a substantial period of
time; they would not then have been embarrassed to discover that the operators
were illiterate-and their approach to the problem could well have been much
simpler. the evolution of a new approach much quicker. and the results as good
as what was finally achieved. The analysts asked to consider the plant consolida-
tion described in section 10.2, on the other hand, got to the bottom of the
problem-the personality conflict-before they had wasted time on a lengthy
study of the issues of the proposed consolidation.
Similarly, a bit of knowledge of fundamental importance and well known to
the persons directly involved in aJ?- operation, but missed by the analysis team,
can destroy the client's confidence in the findings of the analysis. even if this
fact has no bearing on the findings! An analysis team studying the problem of
efficient supply and dispatch of tank cars for a chemical company running a
continuous-process plant missed the fact that the cars had to be steam cleaned
before each use; while this fact had only a very minor effect on the proposed
course of action-indeed. the adjustment was made in a few minutes-the execu,:
live for ｷ ｾ ｯ ｭ the study was done was telling strangers several years later that
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systems analysts were of dubious value. Had the team observed the operations
of the railroad yard at the chemical plant carefully, they would not have over-
looked this fact of vital importance to chemists (since even traces of some
chemicals can spoil chemical processes) that embarrassed the analysis team at
the time it was presenting its results.
In addition to giving the analyst a well rounded view of the problem situa-
tion, a careful initial survey may also allow him to discover aspects of ｩｾ
unknown to the responsible executives. It is commonplace for workers to con-
ceal bad newsfro.m.the boss, but share it with an outsider-a fact that presents
the analyst with a problem: If he leaks this bad news to the executive, thus
violating an implied confidentiality, his source of reliable information may be
cut oU, and other difficulties may arise; but, if he ignores it in his work, he risks
reaching concl.us,ions. sufficiently unrealistic to vitiate his findings,.or their
acceptance. There is usually a path past the horns of this dilemma. but no gen-
eral principle can be enunciated beyond one that is supported by a large body of
experience: If the analyst should behave in any way that makes him look to the
workers.like ..an )nspector," valuable information and easy relations will.be)ost:.
The opposite case can also occur, when the executive is seeking some sort
of evaluation looking to organizational'adjustment, when the workers may be
quite uncooperative-with a similar dilemma for the analyst to avoid.
It is usually-wise' to compare the information from this early su:'"Vey with
many persons involved, to be sure that early impressions are accurate, although
judgment will have to be exercised about how trustworthy views and opinions
might be. However. the number and variety of contacts will serve as a useful
and surprisingly effective screening deVice.
Note that we have been talking here about a somewhat informal survey and
investigation, not the formal data gathering that may ensue as the project gets
launched in earnest. In fact, such a survey may be a useful prelude to a decision
about"whether-or-noCt:c)undertake a systems-analysis project.
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With the results of this survey in his notebook and his head. the analyst is
now ready to formulate an initial appreciation of the impacts of the problem
situation and the potential effects of change. at least in broad terms: Is it a tac-
tical matter? Is it a strategic question? Does the situation appear to have
short-term or long-term consequences? Whose interests are affected, just those
of the official inviting in the analysis team, or many others? Is the problem
situation confined to the organization seeking help. or is it more widespread? Is
the impetus for the concern an internal one, or does it come from outside the
organization? This initial appreciation must be tentative. of course. but to make
it explicit is an important step nonetheless-and Chapter 5 provides important
guidance on how to go about it.
Against this background. the analyst is ready to formulate his preliminary
synthesis of the situation, perhaps leading to a tentative problem statement. He
now has some idea of the nature of the problem. what its boundaries may be.
what at least some potential responses might be. what information may be
needed to pursue the analysis, what data-gathering work must be undertaken on
a systematic basis, and. most important of all at this stage, what management
help will be needed to make the work proceed smoothly to an effective conclu-
sion.
Thus. the analyst is now ready to prepare the analysis plan. a step often
neglected. but one that is in my view absolutely essential to a successful project
of large scale.
The skeptic may argue that, if research is exploring the unknown, how can
the exploration be planned? On the other hand, the experien.ced systems
analyst will respond that the precedent of pure science is only very partially
applicable to systems analysis. and that experience shows a well developed plan
to be an invaluable gUide to action, even when unforeseen events or difficulties
arise, not the least because having the plan shows quickly what the effects of
such unforeseen-matters may have on schedules, resource needs, and so on.
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Too, the team leader needs to have an estimate of time, resources, and sup-
port that he can put forward early, and the more detail that underlies this esti-
mate. the more reliable it is likely to be.
A good analysis plan will at least:
1. Describe the context of the problem.
2. State the problem in the preliminary form developed in the initial sur-
vey.
3. List the other organizations with interests in the problem and its out-
come, along with suitable descriptions. including any work that they may be
doing on the problem.
4. List the data and information needed to investigate the problem. and
the activities needed to gather this information and process it for use in the
analysis.
5. Layout the analysis activities that are foreseen.
6. Project a schedule of key events in the progress of ｴ ｨ ｾ analysis and in
the reporting activities. that will accompany and follow the analysis.
7. Envision the products of the analysis activity (reports. briefings.
backup material. and so on).
B. Specify the resources needed to carry out the work. including the
.. reporting and followup' activities.
9. Stipulate the management interactions and assistance needed
throughout the activity.
10. Layout a schedule for reporting activities that will present the results
of the analysis to all of the constituencies that may be affected by. or interested
in. its findings.
11. Give at least a hint, if possible, of the sort of implementation activities
that might be called for (difficult. perhaps impossible, to do at this early stage
when the findings cannot be forecast-but it is not too early for the attention of
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both analysts and client to be drawn to this issue, at least generically).
An. analysis plan may be anything from a short memorandum for a small-
scale study to a long document for a major inquiry. It has many uses:
• It can be used as the basis for negotiating with the client the support
needed for the work.
• It serves as a useful goad to the analysis team to get on with its work (it
is very easy, in the face of conflicting demands and interesting new options, to
let a schedule slip drastically or to let the resources trickle away, particularly
when the project is a major one over a long schedule).
• It is not only a useful check on progress, it also serves as the point of
departure for adjustment when new events or unforeseen difficulties force
changes on the work and its schedule.
• When the analysis team consists of many persons, perhaps at different
locations, the analysis plan can be an essential instrument for keeping their
work coordinated, even though a series of continuing interactions with the team.
leader and other workers may be needed to perfect the coordination.
Candor compels me to admit that practicing systems analysts do not always
prepare analysis plans for their work-indeed, the number who do may be in a
minority: however, my own experience supports the worth of this step so
strongly that I have no hesitation whatever in recommending it strongly to oth-
ers. Such plans are a commonplace among analysts working in consulting firms
seeking analysis engagements with large industrial or governmental clients (the
plan is usually incorporated in the "proposal" to the client), but for groups work-
ing as part of large organizations it is less common, although perhaps more
needed.
Finally, as part of the formulation process, the head of the analysis team
must, as is implicit in the anlaysis plan, negotiate the administrative formalities
that will be associated with the work: financial support, administrative coopera-
tion (both in prov"iding access to information and supplying management partici-
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pants in the work). arrangements for periodic reporting and review. possible
phasing (if the project will entail more than one phase). and a prospect of what
the final reporting process will be (so that the client and the analysis team have
a common expectation).
Experience has shown that the second of the points is particuiarly impor-
tant: It is highly desirable that at least one member of the client organization
participate in the analysis throughout in an appropriate way. This person can
offer many benefits. including these:
• He can facilitate information gathering through his knowledge of the
organization; indeed. he may be able to supply much of what is needed from his
own resources. However. knowing where to go and whom to see can save much
time and effort.
• As a bridge between the analysis team and the management throughout
the project, he can keep them informed about progress between the times when
formal progress reports are rendered. In some cases, this person can even
serve in an informal way to help sell unusual or unexpected findings before they
are finally reported.
• Most contexts have hidden presumptions that everyone takes for granted,
which may escape the analyst, since everyone in the context thinks they do not
need to be stated. If such ignorance persists until reporting time, it can have a
fatal effect on the management's confidence in the team's mastery-of the prob-
lem (as the example of the team doing the chemical-plant analysis not knowing
of the need to steam clean tank cars illustrates). However. the well informed
team member from the management virtually assures that this cannot happen.
The ensuing five sections of this chapter all deal with matters that. from a
more technical standpoint. have been discussed earlier in this Hand-bool:. How-
ever, from the point of view of practice there are some points to be added that
are important, and they will be taken up here.
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5. GATHERING INFORMATION
The inexperienced analyst may set out to assemble everything he can put
his hands on, somewhat indiscriminately, with the result that he will have a huge
pile of data with little information content. Rather, data relevant to the problem
should be gathered on the basis of a carefully worked out plan (it may be the
analysis plan itself, or an addendum thereto) that not only lists sources and
describes how they are to be tapped, but also how the raw data are to be con-
verted to useful information bearing on the problem (see Majone 1980). Care in
planning this work and carrying it out will ensure both relevance andfoc\l.s_and__
may well achieve considerable economy.
It is well to focus on important phenomena from more than one perspec-
tive, in order for internal consistency to be checked and cross checked, to the
end that one has evidence -to--support one's trust in the information....or-Iack--
thereot External sources may be especially important in this regard. if they
can be tapped. It is especially important for operational and technical expertise
to be incorporated in the available information; one of the best ways is to have
such specialists as members of .the interdisciplinary team to contribute.- their -
knowledge throughout the work.
The process of collecting information to support a systems study needs to
have continually before it the fundamental lesson of census taking: that a care-
fully controlled sample is -almost -always going to give-better estimatesthan--a-
poorly controlled attempt at complete enumeration. More important, perhaps.
is the central lesson of my experience: that what one knows about the support-
ing evidence will play a very large role in how the findings of the analysis are
interpreted: This point-argues against using data already gathered unless-abso--
lutely necessary. and certainly against using them without knOWing how they
were gathered and-equally important-how they were processed. In many cases
systems analysts cannot avoid using data gathered elsewhere for other purposes
(such - as population -statistics,-economic- data;- -government-generated-time-
series, and the like), but considerable effort should be devoted to learning how
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these data were developed. and what their strengths and weaknesses are, so that
the findings of the analysis can take account of such knowledge. Perhaps one of
the most important pitfalls of analysis is to put more credence in data than the
way they were developed warrants.
Another pitfall is to gather too much material-thus consuming valuable
time-rather than just the right amount. There is no simple rule to follow,
except perhaps the truism that it is usually better to have a small amount of
reliable information than to have a great deal in which one has little confidence.
6. FORMULATING ALTERNATIVES
Since Chapter 6 deals with this matter, we need not repeat the main points
here. However. it is worth reemphasizing the central importance of dealing with
this issue imaginatively and continually throughout the systems analysis .study.
It should never be too late to introduce a new alternative if ideas and conse-
quences come together to generate a new concept with preferred properties.
Anyone who doubts the importance of generating and considering the most
- "imaginative and promising alternative s should contemplate thepoverty-"of---a -
large-scale systems analysis complete with the full panoply of computer runs,
economic concepts, optimization models. etc., etc .. that confines its attention to
relatively simple primitive alternatives. For example, if the IIASA study of
future world energy supply and -demand-(described-in section'3.5 and-discussed
further in 6.1 and 6.3) had restricted itself to simple alternatives of oil. coal,
water power, nuclear generation, and so on, it would not have been able to con-
sider the contribution of the allothermal coal liquefaction and gasification pro-
. cess that uses heat from breeder reactors or-from-hydrogen"and-that-the-refore
adds greatly to the potential life of the world's coal reserves.
On the borders of the process of formulating alternatives there are some
issues of practice and professionalism that deserve mention, a.lthough little
-- prescriptive" guidance"can be'oHere-cr.--
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An alternative may be deemed to be impractical because it breaches esta-
blished laws, customs, prejudices, or attitudes. This does not necessarily mean
that the alternative should not be considered; rather, it means that, if it is con-
sidered, the analyst will have a much larger burden of persuasion at the end of
his study if it turns out to be attractive on other grounds. At this point he may
face the issue of whether or not to introduce these social issues into his work. or
to leave them for the client to judge. There are fundamental difficulties here, as
Churchman (1979) points out. However, wise counsel is one of courage on the
one hand (the client may surprise you with a burst of venturesome advocacy for
change) but prudence on the other by having less radical proposals available,
even though they may not be as attractive. "Impractical" alternatives have been
known to become practical after being pushed by someone with influence.
Similarly, since a truly important issue worth a major systems analysis is
bound to harbor political issues that will flower into debates when the findings
emerge, political feasibility may be an issue to consider in formulating alterna-
tives. Here again experience offers little advice, although it does give some
encouragement to be venturesome, the analyst being left for the most part to
his own best judgment, which he should develop in concert with his client.
It is here that the analyst may face two of the most important dilemmas of
his profession:
• "'How can he balance his loyalty to science and the profession 'of systems -
analysis with the loyalty to his organization when they corne into conflict?
• In the face of potentially negative responses to alternatives-some
responses being possibly so strong as to threaten the analyst's survival in his
post-how' can he best 'exhibit the venturesome 'courage to design and 'explore
controversial alternatives, and present them as preferred if they occupy this
place in the findings?
The inexperienced analyst's first reaction to these dilemmas may be to
seek simply to avoid them-perhaps by dealing only with problems in which they
cannot occur. But this is to doom him to the relative unimportance of problems
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of little moment: it is almost axiomatic that the coin of importance has a
reverse side that is controversy. Thus, the price the analyst must pay if he is to
deal with problems of large and central importance is that he will be involved in
the dilemmas of loyalty and controversy.
How the analyst is to behave in the face of these dilemmas will be discussed
later in section 10.14.
7. CHOOSING MODES OF ANALYSIS
Systems analysis is driven by its problems. not its methods. Therefore. the
analyst should allow the problem to rule his choice of method. and this choice
should be taken from an eclectic menu. He should choose methods and tech-
niques that are appropriate. avoiding the seduction of popular or convenient
technologies that may seem to add "class" to the analysis, but that are essen-
tially inappropriate. In the same vein. complexities appropriate to the problem
are necessary. and must be incorporated into the analysis. but those introduced
merely to add analytic glitter to the product are to be shunned.
Six positive principles may be enunciated: Choose analytic machinery that
is:
1. Appropriate to the problem and the prospective solutions to it that
may emerge.
2. Matched appropriately to the available information (since an attrac-
tive model that calls for nonexistent data cannot yield trustworthy results).
3. Internally consistent (the delicate analytic machine ry of one part
should not be bludgeoned by hazy speculation in another).
4. Balanced in detail and accuracy (if one enters with order-of-magnitude
estimates, one is seldom entitled to five-figure accuracy in the results, or, if
accurate estimates are combined with very questionable estimates. this fact
should be reflected in how the results are presented).
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5. Appropriately interdisciplinary in the light of the appreciation of the
problem with which the work began and is being continued.
6. Appropriate, if at all possible. to the process of presenting the findings
that will emerge at the end of the study (the client will surely not want to poke
into the details. but a realistic understanding of the main building blocks and
key relations has persuasive value for many users of systems analysis results).
This last point deserves further discussion. The complexities that must be
represented by models in a systems analysis arise from the problem being
treated .. and therefore one may argue that the model complexities are intrinsic.
However, in practice it not infrequently happens that the choice of a model is
not so constrained as this remark would imply: for example, it may be possible
to choose a series of relatively simple connected models rather than one very
complicated comprehensive model. and yet get adequate results. When such a
choice exists. there is some merit in making it at least partially in the light of
how the results of the work will have to be presented to the client. If the model
used also provides a simple line of argument that will be persuasive to a non-
technical person, this value should be weighed in making the choice.
Howard Raiffa, the founding Director of the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria, describes his experience this
way (Raiffa 1982):
As an' analyst I have 'participated -in several policy studies';' as a
professor in a public policy program I have critiqued a host of such stu-
dies; and as a decisionmaker myself or as a consultant to decisionmak-
ers I have seen how such policy studies are used or not used.
And, on the basis of this experience he offers this advice:
In modeling reality for policy guidance there are a host of options
to consider. First of alL some advice: Beware of general purpose,
grandiose models that try to incorporate practically everything. Such
models are difficult to validate, to interpret, to calibrate statistically,
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to manipulate. and most importantly to explain. You may be better off
not with one big model but with a set of simpler models. starting off
with simple deterministic ones and complicating the model in stages as
sensitivity analysis shows the need for such complications. A model
does not have to address all aspects of the problem. It should be
designed to aid in understanding the dynamic interactions of some
phase of your problem. Other models can address other phases.
Time constraints, however. may not allow you the luxury of tailor-
ing models to fit your problem. You may have to choose a model off
the shelf. so to speak. and fiddle with fitting it as well as possible to
your problem. But in these cases my advice is even more cogent:
Keep it simple.
8. CARRYING OUT THE ANALYSIS
This issue has been discussed so thoroughly in earlier chapters that little
needs saying here. However. three points deserve emphasis:
• The issue of documentation should be kept in mind from the beginning.
The work should be documented'as it proceeds. so that, at its end. when atten-
tion is properly focused on communicating the findings and following up on
them. it will not be necessary to return to the earlier work to
reconstruct-sometimes with considerable difficulty-what was done. Documen-
tation is as much-a part of the professionalism of systems analysis as it is of
pure science. and the need to have full and clear records at the end of the pro-
ject should be recognized and responded to. The easiest way to achieve this
essential standard is to keep it in mind throughout, and to do what is necessary
at each step orthe analysis-'to-build the records that will allow others to see
clearly what was done. and. if they should ever desire, to duplicate or extend the
work.
• The work of the analysis should be done openly, so that the participating
/
personnel from the decisionmaker's staff can understand, interpret. and report
informally to their colleagues what is going on. This policy risks possible
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misinterpretation, but this risk is more than overcome by the benefits to be
accrued. This openness should also extend to others who may have legitimate
interests in what is being done.
• Any systems analysis contains the results of major decisions about how to
proceed and how to interpret evidence-but there are also smaller ones that the
analyst must make from day to day as his work proceeds (can we ignore this fac-
tor? is this small-sample estimate adequate? can this result from another study
be relied on? is this small effect apparently exhibited by the data a realistic
representation? and so on). ,Controlling these secondary decisions so that they
do not cumulatively vitiate the main thrust of the analysis is important, particu-
larly in a large study with many parts and many analysts. There are no simple
rules for doing this, beyond the one that says the leaders of the project should
keep careful watch over this issue day by day as the analysis develops. If they
do this, they will assure that the decisions are consistent, and that the potential
impact on the findings can be assessed and reported candidly; if they do not,
important flaws may seep into the work. Pursuant to the first point, it is also
important to document these secondary decisions as carefully as the primary
ones, together with estimates of their potential effects.
Finally, after the analysis is complete, and the findings tentatively formu-
lated, it is wise for the analysts to stand back and review their work. The back-
ground context may have shifted, key client personnel may have changed, the
analysts themselves will have developed new perspectives arising from their
involvement with the problem. and so on-and such factors may have shifted the
perspective on what was done and should have been done. This review may
prompt some change of focus-perhaps even the development of some new alter-
natives for last-minute investigation.
In addition, the review should assess key variables and their impacts, be
sure that the needed sensitivity analyses have been carried out, and carry out
the supplementary analyses that the analysts and their' clients may need to
round out a good understanding of why the results came out as they did, and
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what their implications are.
Finally. before taking the study's results to the client. the analysis team
should consider the advantages of an additional review by a group of analysts
and others who have not participated in the work. Experience shows that such a
careful review before an essentially friendly but perceptive audience can do
much to sharpen the final presentation to the client.
The analyst may argue that, with the work already behind schedule and with
demanding reporting needs staring at him. there is no time for these reviews.
However, if he· skips-·them. he may deny his reporting the balanced current per-
spective that his client will find most persuasive.
9. FORMULATING THE F1NDINGS
The ·scientist-inexperienced in systems analysis may well wonder why-this'
topic needs taking up at all-since the work was aimed at discovering results;
when they emerge surely the analyst recognizes and understands them. How-
ever, the client may not. and it is his understanding that is the goal of the
analysis.. 'Therefore; the experienced analyst knows that formulating the' find-'
ings properly and effectively is a key task in his work, and invol'les some matters
that deserve his careful attention:
• The first of these is the most important: The formulation must be based.
noton-the-intere·s"fs·o(the'analysts. but those of the client officials.
• The formulation should be balanced in terms of their needs and perspec-
tives. Thus. matters of particular interest to them should be emphasized; oth-
ers of minor int.erest should be passed over lightly, or even omitted entirely if
time or space is limited.
• Special attention must be given to important results that may run
counter to intuitive beliefs of the client officials; if their outlooks are to be
changed. the evidence aimed at changing them must be carefully thought
through and effectively presented.
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• Care must be exercised in choosing the form of the argument-the flow of
evidence and logic-that will persude the client of the validity of the results (see
Section 2.7 and Majone 1980), for, if the client does not factor the findings into
his thinking in an effective way, much of the value of the work may be lost.
In sum. while the findings of the analysis may present numerous matters of
interest to the analysts. the items of value and interest to the clients should be
formulated with special attention. an effort that should extend to how best to
present them. The analysts dealing with the estuary-protection problem dis-
cussed in Section 3.4 faced this problem, and deVised a special approach. as we
saw there.
Generally. the approach to systems analysis presented in this Handbook has
advocated continuing reconsideration of the problem as the analysis proceeds;
in fact. of the nine steps in systems analysis listed in Section 1.4. the fourth was:
"Reconsider the problem in the light of the knowledge accumulating during the
analysis." Raiffa (1982) argues the case even more strongly, urging that it is
... helpful occasionally for analytical groups, even in their early
deliberations.. '.'. to dwell a bit on the big picture: From problem for-
mulation to policy generation to analysis to connict resolution to advo-
cacy to implementation and to evaluation; to try to identify those cru-
cial issues that are at the cutting edge of the policy arguments; to
examine,' all along the way-and not only at'the end of the analysis,-how
the separate pieces of analysis can be fused together into a holistic.
balanced. col;l.erent, realistic. acceptable, implementable policy recom-
mendation.
In formulating 'the findings of the analysis'the-'s'ystems anaiy'st has lus last-and-
perhaps most important-opportunity to conduct a sweeping reconsideration of
the problem and the analysis response to it in the full panoply of its surrounding
circumstances. He must make good use of this opportunity.
The analysis plan that was prepared at the beginning of the work included a
section on communicating the findings, and therefore on the sorts of
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communication instruments that would be needed. When the findings are being
formulated it is time to review this section and evolve a more detailed plan for
communicating them, especially since the analysis team has now grown much
more familiar with the client organization and its people. This combination of
knowledge of the results of the study and the needs and interests of the client
will yield a changed and refined communication plan. The next section will dis-
cuss preparing items that may appear in such a plan.
10. PREPARING THE COMMUNICATION INST:RU:MENTS
A major systems analysis study calls, not only for a variety of communica-
tion instruments aimed at the varied audiences who are-or should
be-interested, but also great care in preparing them. Indeed, the analysts who
cop,dllCted the forest-pestanalysisdescribed in Section 1.2 wrote (Holling 1978,
p. 120): "Our experience is that at least as much effort must go into communi-
cation as goes into analysis"-and they cite other experience to confirm this
judgment. While the amount of effort involved in preparing communication
instruments varies from case to case, there can be no doubt that it is a very
important step in the analysis activity. and one that deserves careful and
creative thought.
While several forms of reporting involving a number of media may be called
forr-the written report usually lies at the- core of the communication process.
Not only is this document the central reference for all concerned, but also its
preparation is the final testing ground for how the findings will be presented. It
is the wellspring from which all of the other communication instruments flow. I
will discuss this documenLfirst, although_the _actuaL order of work may differ; for
example. pressure from the client frequently forces the presentation process to
begin with a briefing based on or followed by a rough draft. with the finished
final report following later.
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The systems analysis report. The report on the findings should contain
three parts:
1. A summary (complete enough to tell the busy executive in a few
minutes what the problem was. what ground the analysts covered in their work.
what the findings were. and what courses of action are being proposed).
2. The main report (written entirely in the language of the client organi-
zation and containing the complete story of the work from a nontechnical point
of view),
3: The appendiXes' or 'supporting technical reports (containing the com-
plete technical presentation of the analysis including a programmer's manual
and a user's manual for any computer programs to be transferred to the client).
To provide perspective, such a report could have a main body of several
-
hundred pages, a summary of about 25 pages, and perhaps more than a
thousand pages of supporting material, perhaps available as separate docu-
ments. For a less comprehensive study, the summary might be ten pages long.
the main body 80 pages. with 150 pages of appendixes containing the technical
material. For exampie: The global analysis of energy supply and demand
described in section 3.5. which occupied an a!lalysis team over a seven-year
span. was supported by some 80 technical reports (Which in turn rested on a
vast literature); the technical report is a book of over 800 pages. This book and
its supporting reports' constitute for this case the third item in the list above.
The "main report" is a book for the general reader of some 200 pages; the sum-
mary was published separately in a paperback report of about 60 pages. See
Energy Systems Program Group (1981).
The audiences are important in deciding what to say and how to say it: the
summary is for busy officials who only want a quick view, the main body is for
the officials and members of their staffs who want a full story in nontechnical
terms, the appendixes are for technical experts who may want to review details.
or perhaps even extend the work at a later time.
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The academic scientist accustomed to the space eXigencies of today's
technical journals may be startled by the redundancy of this approach: the
same story is told three times in differing versions. depending on the audience.
However, experience shows that academic conciseness will fail to 'communicate
with the key audiences. while this redundant form. if well executed, will be effec-
tive.
The other novelty of this outline is the order in which it should be filled in.
The experienced analyst does not start at the beginning with the summary;
rather. he starts with. the appendiX materiaL shaping it so that it willsupport
the main body when it is written. This supporting material should be complete:
data, assumptions, models, results of calculations. rationales for interpreta-
tions, and so on and so on. After completing this foundation, at least in draft
form. the analyst proceeds to write the main body of the report. keeping careful _
watch that its text rests solidly on the supporting material and that it speaks to
the client and the members of his staff. At the same time, he has an eye on the
exigencies of the summary that will bring the writing to a close. In fact, if the
main body is shaped properly, the summary will almost write itself-after _the
heavy labor that preceded, an unalloyed joy! For example, the reports describ-
ing the findings of the global energy analysis mentioned above were written in
the sequence just described.
There is another piece of advice that comes from experience: throughout
the process of preparing the written report, .it is wise to keep in mind the other
communication instruments to be used. such as briefings with charts, slide
shows. computer demonstrations, and so on (Holling 1978, Chapter 9, suggests
some of the variety that has been useful in ecological work). Thus. material
such as illustrations. charts, and tables can be worked up early, since these will
be useful later in the various media of communication that are adopted. Then
the written outlines, structural elements. and carefully worded findings will be
all that will need.to be addedlater_.
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Let us now turn to a more detailed discussion of the content of the main
report. It should contain:
• Key aspects of the context surrounding the problem (while the audience
for the report can be assumed to have a general knowledge of this context, it is
usually the case that the appreciation of key aspects of it needs sharpening if
the analysis and its findings are to be understood properly).
• A statement of the problem as it was finally evolved during the analysis.
• The principal facts and assumptions on which the analysis is based.
• The alternatives considered (it is very important to take particular care
with this section if. as is likely, any of the alternatives considered are novel or
likely to be surprising to the client. or if it is necessary to explain why some
"obvious" alternatives have not been dealt With).
• The key elements in the chain of logic leading to the analysis results (this
item is discussed further below).
• The findings.
• The implications of the findings (this ｾ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ foreshadows the next one on
courses of action).
• Possible plans for implementation, their advantages, disadvantages, and
consequences.
• New'demands posed by these plans: resources, reorganization, new
outlooks, etc.
• Recommendations, if the analysis warrants them.
• A careful delineation of the ground covered by the analysis, and, even
more important, the limits of the analysis and the ground not covered (this last
point is an essential item of good professional practice, since it marks out the
area in which the systems analysis can help the client, as well as the area in
which the client must continue to rely on his own judgment and such other infor-
mation as he has; thus, the analyst avoids the pitfall of appearing to have done
more than he actually did).
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The scientist entering systems analysis from another field may be surprised
that this outline contains only one passing reference to the center of much of
his professional interest, the analytic machinery that produced the results. and
this reference is in novel language ("the key elements in the chain of logic lead-
ing to the analysis results"). There is a good reason for this: Unless the client is
very unusual, he is not interested in such details. nor will an attempt to educate
him about them be anything but counterproductive. However, there may be a
simplified chain of logic based on the analysis details that sheds light on why the
results came out as they did; in fact, this is usually the case. at least partially.
To present this logical chain will be helpful; it should be included it' it does not
take too much space.
The technical appendixes provide the support for the findings presented in
the main body oLth.e_ ,r:eport: however. they need not repeat the peripheral
material from the main body-although they should be full enough to stand
pretty well alone. Here the analyst is talking to his professional colleagues, and
may use any of the jargon. formulas, or other technical paraphernalia common
in his field. although._ stil,l there may need to be care over communication
between colleagues of different basic expertises.
The summary is written for the busy executive, and thus it should be rela-
tively short. However, it must contain a boiled down version of all of the impor-
tant material in the main body of the report, so that this busy executive gets a
rounded picture. Thus, it cannot be too short (such as the length of the usual
technical-paper abstract), since it must be long enough to exhibit the problem
formulation. the structure of the solution, the findings. and the recommenda-
tions. _Itshouldcontain..not only the text needed to convey the central message
of the study. but also figures and tables (very carefully chosen and prepared)
that will illuminate this message. Careful preparation of this summary is also
the best preparation for the oral briefings and discussions that will almost inev-
itably. follow comple.tioILoLthe analysis. Under some .circumstances .. asurnmary
of the summary may also have to be prepared.
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With the written report prepared, the analysis team is ready to turn to
other forms of presentation, such as oral briefings. slide shows, movies, articles,
and so on. What needs to be done is dictated by the context of the study itself.
However, the commonest form of presentation other than the written report is
the oral briefing, to which we now turn.
Oral presentations. The dominant constraint for the oral presentation is
time. The scientist used to the leisurely fifty-minute academic lecture will, no
doubt, experience considerable shock to find that client executives may expect
I
the findings of a major systems study to be presented in half an_.q,our_-or
perhaps even as little as twenty minutes! Such short allotments of time are not
desirable, but they are not unknown-and, if they represent the opening that
presents itself, the analysts should be prepared to use it to good effect. In any
case,_ time will be limited. and the analyst who is the spokesman forth;e. _team
must plan accordingly.
The scientist comfortable with the blackboard talk with chalk in hand, occa-
sionally jotting a note or graph on the blackboard, may feel that this experience
will carryover easily to this new situation-but he couldn't be more wrong.--The Ｎ ｾ ｩ
goal is to squeeze as much hard information as possible into a very limited time:
Therefore, techniques to 'achieve this goal are called for, and how to use them
must be carefully planned. The central lesson of experience here is that a brief-
ing built around carefully prepared visual aids can be made to meet .the -need.
Such visual aids can be an outline of the main parts of the talk, lists of points,
tables, graphs, maps, photographs, charts, and so on. The goal is to give the
audience dual impressions of key points, oral and visual.
This visual material can-employ a variety of media:
• Stiff chart boards set on easels that the speaker can set down as he fin-
ishes with them.
• A large tablet on an easel whose pages can be turned by the speaker as
he passes from one to the next.
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• Transparent plastic sheets that are set horizontally on a projector that
throws the images on a vertical screen (sometimes called a "viewgraph").
• Slides projected on a screen, with an advancement trigger available to
the speaker.
The first three are appropriate for small to medium-sized groups, but do
not work very well for large groups, because it is difficult to make them large
enough to be seen clearly from the back of the room. Slides are the best option
for large groups, but they have the disadvantage that the room must be dark-
-ened for them to appear to--best-advantage; this fact makes them undesirable
for smaller groups, where the other options are better (the transparent-plastic
projector being perhaps the least desirable of the three possibilities). For any-
thing less than the large group, the media list above is in the order of effective-
- ness and preference.
Chart boards or tablets set on easels offer another advantage that can be
captured simply, and that can be qUite important when a complicated story is to
be told: It is easy to have two or three easels in use simultaneously. For exam-
ple. one- can -be -used for-an -outline of the presentation that remains -in view
throughout, a device that is helpful for persons not used to keeping a series of
logical steps in mind; more importantly, it can also serve to keep the logical pat-
tern of the study before the audience throughout the briefing. When geography,
sophisticated- technology, or -some- other elament 'c-alling for ｰ ｴ ｣ ｴ ｯ ｲ ｡ ｬ Ｍ ｴ ｲ ･ ｡ ｴ ｭ ･ ｮ ｾ
is involved, an easel can be dedicated to such pictures, which can be in view
throughout the portion of the briefing making relevant points. It is easy for the
speaker, who has his hands free, to deal with these materials himself-and this
procedure - has- some-advantages;--it -gives the-speaker-occasional--purposeful-
motion; it allows him to produce the supporting visual evidence at just the
moment of its greatest effectiveness, and it allows him to vary the order simply
and without ｣ ｯ ｭ ｰ ｬ ｩ ｣ ｾ ｴ ･ ､ instructions to a helper when a question from the audi-
enceor -some -other matter suggests that a- variation-would be-helpful-to--effec---
tiveness. The analyst with a well developed set of points to make will find that
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appropriate ways to use the multiple-easel device will come to mind easily.
The general idea of multiple easels can be adapted to veiwgraph and slide
presentations. but it usually calls for more equipment and arrangements than
are likely to be available in the usual business or bureaucratic meeting room.
However. when the equipment and assistance are available, the device can be
effective in these cases.
Before proceeding to discuss the briefing and its charts further, there are
three pitfalls that are so common that they must be mentioned here:
• The visual material- is not legible, particularly to persons sitting at the
back. This pitfall produces a doubly negative effect: the persons at the back
will not get the message fully. and they will not respect the sense of reality of
anyone who ignores so simple a problem. The principle is simple: The visual
material must be clearly legible --to everyone in the room. and this visibility
should be carefully checked before and after the visuals are prepared.
• The visual material is so crowded with words and other information as to
force the audience to make a choice of listening to the speaker or mastering the
details of the visuals. This also detracts from the audience's ability to appreci-
ate the message, and reduces their receptivity to it by producing a strain on
their attention. The principle again is simple: Keep the visual material simple
enough to be comprehended at a glance: In a list of points do not write whole
sentences. put down two or-three-key- words that will be explained by what you
say; in a table. do not display several dozen numbers that the audience cannot
analyze. show in a reduced table the few that are significant to your point. Keep
graphs simple, but be sure to label the axes and units clearly.
• The speaker prepares a complete text of what he has to say and then
drones through it (with the visuals not always well coordinated with the text).
The speaker plunged into this pitfall fails to establish the appearance of smooth
competence. and distracts the audience by drawing its attention to mechanics.
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There are various ways to avoid the last pitfall: The man with a good
memory that works well while he is on his feet can leave the manuscript in the
file and do splendidly; most, however. hesitate to rely on memory at so crucial a
time, and want props to be sure that all points are covered in the right order.
For these persons there are three possibilities: (1) if the visuals include enough
points-and a well prepared set usually will-they will serve alone to keep the
speaker on his chosen path, allowing him to keep his hands free and giving the
audience the feeling of relaxed discipline that makes the best impression; (2) if
there are points that must be made that are not on the visuals and the speaker
has chosen to use either board charts or tablet pages, these points can be pen-
ciled lightly on the edges of the visuals so as to be clearly visible to the speaker
but invisible to the audience; and (3) some inconspicuous papers or cards can be
laid on the stand in front of the speaker. These possibilities are listed in order
of effectiveness and preference.
These remarks about the oral presentation of the study results may appear
to suggest that this is the most difficult part of all-but this lies counter to my
experience. One has only to remember that the study has been done. the report
and its summary written, and the material developed there available both in
hard copy and the team leader's mind to realize that the job is merely one of
selecting and shaping; indeed, it is one of the most pleasurable of the systems
analyst's tasks, provided he takes pains to learn to do it well.
The project spokesman prepares a careful outline for his briefing. assem-
bles the relevant graphs and charts. identifies the points to be made with each.
and goes over the combination several times to establish continuity and com-
pleteness to hi& satisfaction. He is then ready for the final steps of preparation.
Here there is a fact from experience that may seem. at odds with all of the fore-
going admonitions: to achieve a good effect the visual material does not have to
be prepared by commercial artists or engineering draftsmen. In fact. many
analysts _with modest_ drafting and lettering skills can _pre pare _their own. _espe-_
cially when time is severely limited (as is often the case). Felt pens. which are
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available in many colors, used on paper that shows a dim set of straight lines
directly or through from a sheet below produce effective visuals even in amateur
hands when some care is taken. If the speaker prepares his own. he inevitably
finds some further refinements emerging from the rethinking forced on him by
the preparation process.
Next. with the briefing and its visuals prepared. it is essential to have a
practice run in front of a friendly audience-the rest of the analysis team and
perhaps others close to the work are the choice. This "dry run" will- yield many
__｢･ｮ･ｦｾｴｳＮ not the least of which will be the speaker's confidence in what he is
saying and how he has chosen to say it-and how long it will take.
Finally, there are some points to be made about time. If the manager has
allotted 30 minutes for the meeting, it would be imprudent to prepare a 30-
-minute -briefing for it. Schedules often do not hold exactly; most meetings
spend at least a few minutes on introductions, pleasantries, and orienting
remarks: and even a single question from an interested official will ruin so tight
a schedule. Thus. the formal talk should be planned to fill only a portion of the
.time:.how much should be left for questions. discussion, and delay is a judgment
best left to persons familiar with the administrative setting involved.
If the study deals with an important problem and has reached challenging
results. there will be lots of questions and discussion. The speaker can answer
. -·some-pointS',· but· his team should be there to expand on them and to answer
ones on which their knowledge is more thorough. It is also well to have some
additional charts available that can be used to discuss such questions. Even
though one cannot be sure just what questions will be asked, his knowledge of
--the- subject allows him to make some shrewd and accurate predictions, and, if
there is material ready to help respond to a significant number of them, the
impression of the analysis team's care and thoroughness is greatly enhanced.
If the study dealt with an important issue in which many people are
- involved-:-- an--effectlve firsC' presentation will inevitably call for further
briefings-perhaps even dozens of them. Each must be tailored to the group
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being addressed-and here is where many of the charts that may have been
backup for the original audience will come into play, as the special interests of
various groups are discussed. The context of the study will suggest what possi-
bilities may emerge-and it will be well to capture their opportunities promptly
by having most of the needed material ready. or nearly so, so that the peak of
interest prompted by the initial reaction will not be lost before the followup
briefings are given.
Concluding remarks. There are other forms of presentation that may
emerge from a major systems study. such as slide shows, movies, articles for the
nontechnical press. and so on. but they will not be discussed here. since they
are likely to involve experts who can bring appropriate standards to bear on
them.
Throughol1t these processes of preparing the communication instruments,
there are key ｾ ｨ ｡ ｲ ｴ ｳ and tables that play central roles. Thus, at the beginning,
when technical discussions for the appendix are being prepared. it is time to
think about th1em and prepare them. The result will be that they-or simplified
versions-will carry through the main body of the report. its summary, and the
tbriefings. Preparing them early will help tie all of the versions together; indeed,
all of the lateriversions can be built around these carefully prepared charts and
tables worked out during the preparation of the most technical version of the
report.
lFinally, throughout the process of preparing the communication instru-
ments. the audience should be uppermost in the minds of the analysis team, and
the language and mode of argument should be appropriate to this audience (or,
as may be the :case, these audiences): This does notmean talking- down 'to' these
people-they differ from the analysts only in background and training, not in
intelligence-but rather using their vocabulary whenever possible, and taking
care to define and illustrate the new terms that must be introduced into the
explanations.- :The most important thing to-do is to present-a-lineof evidence
and logic that will be persuasive to the audience, and that will build their
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confidence in the reliability and acceptability of the findings; the concepts and
language must be the ones appropriate to this purpose. even if they present dif-
ficulties to the audience. Thus. our warning here is not against difficulty. but
only against difficulty that is not needed for this purpose.
11. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
While any thorough systems analysis will have explored its problem area
carefully, and performed a variety of analyses. including those to explore the
sensitivities of the results. time is always limited and not everything possible will
have been done. Thus. during the communication process there will inevitabl"y
arise questions that call for additional analysis. The team should anticipate this
need, and be prepared to respond to it.
12. THE COMMUNICATION· CAMPAIGN
When the problem dealt with by a systems analysis is relatively simple and
there is only one decisionmaker with relevant responsibility and authority. the
naive view may be correct: the analyst completes his work. reports its findings
to this official in the form most appropriate for him. observes this decision-
maker choose the desirable course of action, and then retires in satisfaction to
a well earned period of relaxation, with congratulations echoing in his ears.
Regrettably, life is seldom this simple. particularly when a large-scale problem
is in hand and many interests are affected.
Here the analyst cannot just prepare a communication instrument and use
it once; rather. he must plan a comprehensive communication campaign. One of
the most basic reasons is that-in large .organizations -decisions can- be-- made-
widely and at many levels of responsibility-and for a major course of action to
be effective all of these decisions must be coordinated by being based on a com-
mon understanding. not only of what course has been chosen but also the fac-
tors affecting it and how subordinate actions and decisions fit into the scheme.--
Thus. the analysts will in all probability find that they have many people to
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communicate with on many levels; instead of one briefing, they may find them-
selves involved in many. supplemented by a large number of private consulta-
tions. This campaign must be planned and resources allotted to it. so that it can
proceed effectively.
Two examples will serve to offer some insight: the first, based on a personal
experience not documented in the literature, was a systems analysis that occu-
pied a small team about three months and that led to a well defined decision by
a high-level advisory committee; the second deals with the study of world energy
. supply and demand that was mentioned earlier in this chapter (see Section
10.10) and that has been described elsewhere in this Ha.ndbook (especially Sec-
tion 3.5).
Space surveillance. It is a regrettable fact that the space around the earth
contains many pieces of junk-fragments of various sorts from various activities
in space-orbiting the earth at various altitudes and in various planes at angles
with respect to the plane of the equator. Thus, if one wishes to keep careful
watch on some vehicle, either one's 'own or someone else's. it must be discrim-
inated from other items. a process that makes it necessary to keep careful
track of everything.
This need dictates that surveillance instruments be placed about the earth
so as to keep wa';.ch, and to feed the information from the watch into a central
. place where it can be sorted, tdentified.and tracked. A number of years'ago·the-
responsible US officials were considering four new potential alternatives for
maintaining this surveillance, and a high-level advisory committee was expected
to make a recommendation within about 90 days. To support this recommenda-
tion. "the' committee'asked a systems analysis'team to"study' the- feasibility,'
operating properties, and costs of the four possibilities. with oce of the impor-
tant costs being the trained manpower that would be required for each alterna-
tive.
'A'team of some' eight' expertsin'the major contributing techriologies-aiisem--
bled under my leadership to undertake the work. Fortunately. all were familiar
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with the problem setting, so that the exploratory phases of the analysis were not
so time-consuming as is usually the case. This enabled the team to reach a con-
sensus on the problem outline early, and obtain the agreement with the commit-
tee secretariat that it was what would respond to the request. Then, based on
this consensus, the analysis plan was laid out. However. owing to the very short
time allowed for the work, each expert had to work separately, relying on the
team leader for coordination, and each prepared what became a chapter in the
appendix to the final report. As these drafts came to the team leader for review,
he was able to abstract from them the material needed for the main body of the
report. while at the same time preparing visual material and tables that would
be used, not only in the main report, but also in its summary and the oral
presentation of the results that had already been scheduled for the end of- the
analysis period.
Thus, in a final interval of only two or three weeks, all of the basic material
was completed: the technical appendixes, the text of the main report, the sum-
mary. and the visual material for the oral presentation. The whole consisted of
.. Ｎｳｯｉｾ ..e_ 300,_pages, about two thirds of which was technical appendixes, about 75
pages the main report, and about 25 pages of summary. The team leader gave
the oral presentation to the advisory committee on schedule. some 40 minutes
having been allotted. After about twenty minutes of discussion, the committee
agr:.e_e,d_ｾｉｬ｟ｲ･｣ｯｭｉｉｬ･ｮ､｡ｴｩｯｮｳ and sent them forward within a few days.
Some of the good impression created by this analysis was the analysis
team's candor, not only about the analysis that had been done and the results
achieved. but also about the limitations of the work and the technical problems
.(there-were.several) that it. had not been able to solve. .
To the best of my knowledge, the members of the advisory committee never
read the analysis report. However, it served two vital functions: writing it
enforced the discipline of getting the results and testing them carefully before
-presenting-them, and later' it allowed'a -number of technical 'specialists 'else-
where to check the work for adequacy before incorporating its findings into
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their own ongoing investigations.
In this relatively simple case. the time allotted was short. the number of
people involved directly was less than ten (although quite a few others were con-
sulted or made small contributions), and the advisory committee acted essen-
tially as a single decisionmaker. During the first halt of the analysis period. the
team leader was primarily concerned with setting the problem, assembling the
analysis team, laying out the analysis plan. and getting the work started; during
the latter halt of the analysis period, much of his effort was devoted to coordi-
nating. focusing. and carrying out the communications work (working with the
team members to improve the appendixes, preparing material for the main
report and then the report itselt, writing the summary. and preparing the brief-
ing material). these activities also serving to bring the analytic work to well
defined closure focused sharply on the needs of the client.
Providing energy for the future. This study was conducled at the Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Laxenburg, Austria. and began in
the summer of 1973. The team leader, Wolf Haefele, summarizes the phases of
the study this way: "The study ... focused for the first two years on understand-
ing and conceptualizing the energy problem. This led to the design of a set of
energy models that were subsequently used for developing two scenarios-the
principal tool in our quantitative analysis. A preliminary draft of our findings
was completed in 1978 and sent out for review.. The widespread substantive ...
comments received on this draft were carefully considered in finalizing our
report. This book, which was completed in December 1979. reflects our work up
to this date" (Energy Systems Program Group 1981. volume 2). In the mean-
. time, although.the team at work at anyone time was never very large, soma...140.
people from more than 20 nations had been involved in the work over a period of
seven years. While the volume Haefele refers to here (the 800-page technical
report mentioned earlier in section 10.10) was being given final review and being
prepared for .the .press ..work on. the 200-page book that. occupies theplace..of..
the main report was going forward. Both books appeared in the spring of 1981.
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followed shortly thereafter by the eO-page summary.
In the meantime, a program of other forms of communication had beglID
with speeches (see, for example, Haefele and Basile 1979). summary articles (for
example, Haefele 1980), and too many consultations to mention. As this is writ-
ten (in late 1981) a major communication program is under way with industry
and government groups and individuals involving dozens of oral presentations
and hundreds of hours of consultations and cooperative work with teams wishing
to incorporate facets of the IIASA findings into their own work-in sum, a com-
munication program too widespread and various to be susceptible of easy sum-
mary here. The point, however, is clear: the analytic work has had to be' fol-
lowed up with a major communication campaign leading to activities in imple-
mentation, and to changes in perspective, as described at the end of section 9.3.
Concluding remarks. This discussion has been intended to underline the·,
importance of haVing an appropriate communication plan, assigning the effort
to carry it out, and pursuing it with the same vigor and attention that was
devoted to the analysis. Indeed, such an effort is an essential complement to
doing the analytical work; it may consist of writing the report and giving a single
oral presentation, as in the space surveillance example, or it may demand the
effort of several people over an extended period, as in the case of the IIASA
energy study-but without it the work may be wasted.
A communication-plan' depends-so intrinsically on the problem' and its-
administrative setting that there is little guidance of a general sort that can be
given beyond urging that it get careful attention and adequate effort.
However, it is important that the analysts preserve a balanced, objective
pos'ture" thro'ugho'uC-"They "must appreciate-- and acce'pt, not-only the analysis-
findings and their implications, but also the concerns of the many persons
potentially affected by the new course of action and the additional matters that
they must consider.
In the earlier chapters of this Handbook, especially Chapter 9, we have
stressed the importance of following up in the implementation phase after a
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course of action has been chosen. Thus, there is little to add here, except to
affirm the importance of planning for this work, at least tentatively, so that in
the happy event it should have to be done, all will be ready. It may involve addi-
tional analyses to respond to new conditions or unforeseen problems. as well as
fairly comprehensive consultation interactions as the course of action is pur-
sued.
13. SYSTEMS ANALY'SIS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE
Systems analysis is intrinsically an approach to solving real sociotechnical __
problems. As Section 2.7 argues, it
... is concerned with theorizing, choosing, and acting. Hence its
character is three-fold: descriptive (scientific), prescriptive
-----(advisory), and persuasive (argumentative-interactive).- In--fact,if we
look at the fine structure of analytic arguments we see a complex
blend of factual statements, methodological choices, evaluations,
recommendations, and persuasive definitions and communications. An
-even more complex structure emerges when- we look at.-the-interac--- -
tions taking place between analysts and different audiences of spon-
sors, policy makers, evaluators, and interested publics. Moreover,
descriptive propositions, prescriptions, and persuasion are intertwined
--in a way that rules out the possibility of applying a unique set ｯ ｦ ･ ｶ ｡ ｬ ｵ ｡ ｾ Ｍ ﾭ
tive criteria, let alone proving or refuting an argument conclusively.
Further, as this Handbook shows, and as Section 2.7 states, systems analysis "is
a craft. The systems analyst as craftsman is a producer of data, information,
--andargurnents,-but also-a -social-change-agent.- He-must influence -some-people------- ----
to accept his proposals, and other people to carry them out; he is expected to
take some responsibility for implementation." In sum, to use Boothroyd's (l978)
suggestive phrase, he is engaged in "articulate intervention" into the activities
- -of- ｳｯ｣ｴｯｴ･｣ｨｮｩ｣｡ｬＭｰｲｯｧｲ｡ｭｳｾＭ
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However. the matter goes even deeper: The systems analysis team cannot
stand aside from the sociotechnical system it is investigating; rather, it is both
easy and realistic to argue that the team is itself a subsystem in this larger
system-a state of affairs that faces the analyst with deep and important philo-
sophical questions, as well as more practical ones of standards of professional
behavior and ethical choice. Problems of philosophy and ethics, as they relate
to systems analysis have been explored (notably by Churchman 1978 and 1979),
but remain in a sufficiently restless state to make summarizing them inap-
propriate for this Ha.ndbook. However, this is not to say that they are not impor-
tant, or that we should not put discussions of the common views in a leading
position if they existed; rather. it is to say that the stream of thinking has not as
yet. unfortunately, permeated the community of systems analysts to an extent
sufficient to allow us to state a view that represents the center of gravity of this
community's outlook. Few would question that problems of philosophy and eth-
ics, as they relate to systems analysis, are very important; they deserve more
investigation and wider recognition than they have as yet received.
__0I.1.the other hand, issues ｟ ｯ Ｎ ｦ ｟ ｰ ｲ Ｚ ｃ ＿ ｾ ･ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｬ behavior have been given some..
attention by the systems analysis community, and they are discussed in the
next section.
14. GUIDELINES FOR PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR
- ---
A systems analysis can be judged by its outcome, that is, by whether or not
its implemented results improve the operation of the system that has been sub-
jected to study. By this criterion the investigation of improving blood availabil-
tty-and .utilization descr.ibed.in.section.3...2.can...be judged to have.been.success- .
fut since the new system of managing the supply showed properties that were
substantially improved over what was experienced before it was installed.
On the other hand, many system studies deal with problems and issues
'Wb-ere-the 'outcome -test -will-be-intrrnsically' denied... For'example; the·IIASA
study of how best to supply the demand for energy for the next 50 years cannot
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be judged by testing its outcomes as in the blood-supply case. Even if world
energy leaders adopt and implement some of its findings, the outcome test will
in all probability not be possible. as experience with alternative courses will not
be available for comparison. Here we must base our judgment of the quality of
the work on criteria relating to the process by which the results were achieved.
Thus. the professional behavior of a systems analyst can be judged by stan-
dards internal to his work (relating to the process by which the results are
obtained) or external to it (by judging both its outcomes and the analyst's rela-
,. tions to society).
Internal evaluation. The previous section reminds us that systems analysis
must be viewed as a craft. Majone (1980) carries the argument forward in this
way:
- 'The-systems analyst as craftsman goes through -essentially the
same operations that the scientist performs; and both scientist and
analyst replicate on an abstract conceptual level what the traditional
craftsman or artisan. does with material objects and physical tools.
The artisan applies his tools'to certain materials in order to produce"
an object fulfilling a given function. The intellectual craftsman (analyst
or scientist) works on abstract materials (data, concepts, theories)
using different tools and methods (mathematical. logical, "hardware")
in'-'order 'to '-produce--an--argument "supporting certain conclusions
and/or recommendations .. ,
The notion of craft is intimately related to that of quality stan-
dards. Indeed, the main function of the master craftsman (and also. to
, ,-some- extenC'of the-patrons "and connoisseurs of the craft)' is- cre'ating'
standards of quality for the other practitioners. These standards usu-
ally remain inarticulate (they are taught more by example than by
preaching). but they are nonetheless quite effective in guiding and con-
---, trolling-tJie--work or'the-craftsmen','''Sdentific 'leaders' fulfill'similar-
functions for their disciplines, with the support of institutional
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mechanisms like professional organizations, refereed journals, and
academies.
. . . the profession [of systems analysis] is beginning to understand
that quality control (in the case of [systems analysis] ... as of all other
intellectual activities) is intimately related to a sophisticated under-
standing of process.
One of the main purposes of this Handbook has been to make quality stan-
dards of the craft of systems analysis explicit. and much of the discussion in the
previous chapters serves this purpose. It is·also useful to examine the pitfalls
into which unwary analysts have stumbled: and some of these have been
described at appropriate places; however, Majone and Quade (1980) have com-
piled a large and very useful collection, together with leads to other literature
on this important subject.
Systems analysis is still relatively young, and its standards are still develop-
ing. Thus, both the producer and us.er of systems analysis results would do well
to conduct a continuing examination of such work as it emerges in order to
refine their understanding and application of such standards.
External evaluation. Whenever possible, the most important external stan-
dard of evaluation for systems analysis results is to compare their implemented
outcomes with earlier experience. In fact, in section 1.4 the list of nine possible
steps"in a systems" analysis 'study hasas-j£s-las'f one' "evaluate-the- r'e'sults- 0(--
implementing the chosen courses of action." Thus, from the beginning we have
considered this form of external evaluation to be an important step in systems
analysis itself.
Relations with society. However, society. whose future may well be affected
by systems analysis results, has other concerns about systems analysis. Since
society is not, in generaL well equipped, either to judge whether or not craft
standards ｨ ｡ ｶ ｾ been met or to evaluate fully the efficacy of outcomes (particu-
larly when no relatively simple comparisons can be made), it expects this new
profession to hew to high standards of professional behavior. Such standards
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could be imposed by society from outside the profession. or they could be esta-
blished by the profession itself. And. of course. society's chief concern with
such standards is how they might govern the profession's relations to society.
So far, while there have been scattered expressions of concern about such
standards by persons not in the profession (see. for example, Miser 1973. which
mentions some examples), there has been no movement to impose such stan-
dards from without. However. there have been some efforts within the profes-
sion. although it cannot yet be said that a consensus has been reached. Thus. all
..thatcan be. done here is to sketch some of the key strands ofthought that have
appeared in the writings on this subject by professional leaders in systems
analysis.
The need for standards of professional behavior was recognized early: the
constitution of the Operations Research Society of America adopted in 1952
stated that one of the objects of the Society was "the establishment and mainte-
nance of professional standards" and the Society's second president called in
1954 for professional and ethical standards (Rinehart 1954). as did the eleventh
president nine years later (Miser 1963). However, as section 2.6 describes. the
issue lay dormant until 1971, when the Society proposed a tentative set of
"guidelines" (Caywood et al. 1971). which failed. however. to achieve a position of
authority in the profession. Since then. there has been no effort by a profes-
- sionalgroup of systems analysts to promulgate standards aimed at acceptance
by the profession as a whole, although in the United States there has been a
growing more general concern about the relations of science and technology to
society. and. in particular. the appropriate ways for scientists to affect public
.-policies_(Chalk._FrankeL.and -Chafer 1980) .. _However._some. _writers have __
addressed the subject. and several threads have been fairly Widely accepted as
important.
• Openness. Section 10.8 declares that "documentation is as much a part
- - of·the'professionalism-of systems analysis as it-isot-pure-science,' and--the-need--'
to have full and clear records at the end of the project should be recognized and
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responded to." However, this principle extends beyond the written reports
(which were the context in which this statement was made) to other forms of
communication and discussion. The systems analyst should be as candid about
the weaknesses, arbitrary judgments, and limitations of his work as he is about
its findings and their strengths. Curiously. in my experience this does not
weaken his case (as the inexperienced might expect); rather, it strengthens his
authority as an analyst who knows what he knows, and, more importantly, knows
what he does not know. The space-surveillance example of section 10.12 illus-
trates the point: "Some of the good impression created by this analysis was the
analysis team's candor, not only about the analysis that had been done and the
results achieved, but also about the limitations of the work and the technical
problems (there were several) that it had not been able to solve." Thus, the pro-
fessional principle of openness is an inviting one, rather than painful and forbid-
ding.
Sugden and Williams (1978) say that "The analyst must owe some allegiance
to intellectual honesty," a loyalty that is almost certainly supported by the prin-
ciple of openness.
Similarly, a number of writers call in various ways for objectivity-an elusive
property hard both to define and achieve. However, candor about one's work
and its background can move the communication firmly in this direction, even
. though the difficulties are severer as Quade (1975) points out:
It is rarely possible to carry out an analysis of a public issue in
such a way that all those who hold various views of the issue involved
will consider it fair and objective. Generally, this is unavoidable owing
-to-the nature-of the-issues', 'uncertainty-and differingviews-of values -. '.
. . . Openmindedness, willingness to follow evidence wherever it
may lead, and readiness to reconsider conclusions when doubts arise
than marks. Policy analysts are people like anybody else.
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• The obligations of a profession. Professions stake out claims with society
and bind themselves to address classes of problems appropriate to their
knowledge and skills; for example, medicine addresses problems of health. law
problems of social regulation. systems analysis the operating and policy prob-
lems of government and industry and their interaction with society and the
environment. In return. society accords these groups certain rights, privileges,
and respect-usually including setting standards of training, behavior. and self-
regulation. The implication is that society will be better off as a consequence of
the intervention of the professions. and that. in turn. the professions will be suit-
ably supported. In sum. there is a mutual obligation.
But this view places a burden on the individual members of the profession;
they must not only be loyal to their employers (for the systems analysts. their
decisionrnaking clients) but also to their profession and, through this profession.
to the society that supports it and accords it its privileges. Sugden and Williams
(1978) present the argument in the context of cost-benefit analysis. but it
applies equally well to systems analysis:
-- An ethical justification for the decision-making approach to cost-
benefit analysis must start from beliefs about how a political system
ought to operate. Given particular beliefs of this kind, one can argue
that in a democratic community the use of cost-benefit analysis contri-
.butes to the good of society; cost-benefit analysis ought to be used.
The argument begins from the assertion that the role of the analyst is
to assist, not simply a decision-maker, but a decision-making process
that has the assent of the community (\.s a whole. In this process the
community.- as. well as the decision-maker and the analyst. is involved.
The decision-maker is responsible for making a decision, according to
his own lights, but he is responsible to the community. His right to
decide stems from the consent of the community, expressed through
____ the_political system. __The community. then, ought to. have the right-to
call upon the decision-maker to account for his decisions.
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In this framework, cost-benefit analysis has a dual function. It
assists the decision-maker to pursue objectives that are, by virtue of
the community's assent to the decision-making process, social objec-
tives. And by making explicit what these objectives are, it makes the
decision-maker more accountable to the community.
This view of cost-benefit analysis, unlike the narrower value-free
interpretation of the decision-making approach, provides a justifica-
tion for cost-benefit analysis that is independent of the preferences of
the analyst's immediate client. An important consequence of this is
that the role of the analyst is not completely subservient to that of the
decision-maker. Because the analyst has some responsibility to princi-
ples over and above those held by the decision-maker, he may have to
ask questions that the decision-maker would prefer not to answer, and
which expose to debate conflicts of judgment and of interest that
might otherwise comfortably have been concealed. [Italics in the origi-
nal.]
• Forms of intervention. This Handbook has dealt from first page to last
with the intervention of systems analysts (scientists from a variety of discip-
lines) in the operations, plans, and policies of sociotechnical systems-and the
emphasis throughout has been on careful study, documented as fully as possible
and reported as openly as feasible. However, social history of the last two
decades has seen scientists (including some calling themselves systems
analysts) widely involved in public advocacy in a variety of ways.
Milton Katz of the faculty of the Harvard University Law School has provided
the US National Academy of Sciences an illuminating diSCussion of how this prob-
lem has been dealt wi.th by the profession of law (Katz 1972):
When the expert speaks within the scope of his expertise, he may
justly claim-and be accorded-a degree of special authority for his.
opinion.' When he speaks as a citizen on a question of general policy, he
is entitled-no more and no less than any other citizen-to have his
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views considered fairly and objectively on the basis of such merit as
they may be found to contain. If he should purport to speak as an
expert on matters outside the sphere of his special knowledge and
skill, he would be assuming a false mantle of authority ...
. . . The legal profession has had its own difficulties with this
problem. It has tried to protect itself-and others-by formalizing the
distinction between a legal opinion and a legal brief. When a lawyer
renders a legal opinion, he is expected to give a coldly analytical objec-
tive opinion. letting the chips fall where they may. When he presents a
brief, it is understood that he is making the best argument that he can
make under the circumstances. whatever his objective analysis may
be. When the stakes are high or when energy, patience and time are
short, the distinction may become blurred; but the lawyer's code of
professional conduct enjoins him to keep it clear. When he is at his
best. he does so.
I do not intimate that the form of the lawyer's distinctions
between legal opinion and a statement of policy or between a legal
opinion and a legal brief should be adopted by the National Academy of
Sciences ... or its members. 1 do venture to suggest that the sub-
stance of the distinctions may usefully be adapted to the situation of
the Academy ... and its members if and when they address themselves
to societal problems and seek to feed their insights into the legislative
process or the processes of the executive branch. Such an adaptation
would import the gradual evolution and refinement of an accepted
practice under which the Academy ... and its members would regu-
larly take pains to sort out, recognize, and identify the mode in which
they are proceeding: whether they are rendering an objective assess-
ment or advocating a cause, and whether they are speaking as experts
within their field of special knowledge and competence or as citizens
concerning a question of general public policy. Under such a practice,
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there would be no suggestion that they must restrict themselves to any
one mode. But they would be expected to be clear themselves and to
make clear to others which mode they were choosing; and they would
be expected to recognize the different implications of the respective
modes.
If, following Katz, we speak of a "scientific opinion." which states what sci-
ence knows and (equally important) what it does not know relating to an issue or
problem, and a "technical brief," which presents technical evidence aimed at
making the most persuasive case for certain conclusions and recommendations.
then we can by extension speak of a "systems analysis opinion" and a "technical
brief," the latter perhaps containing some of the sort of work that would be con-
sidered as systems analysis. With this terminology in mind. it is clear that what
we have been talking. about throughout this Ha.ndbook is the systems analysis
opinion, as Katz puts it, "a coldly analytical objective opinion, letting the chips
fall where they may." even though we recognize the difficulty of reaching so high
a standard, as the quotation from Quade above suggests.
This is not to .suggest that the systems analyst should not be willing from
time to time to help his client with a technical brief: rather. it is to suggest that
he and his client should be clear that this is what he is doing-and, most impor-
tant of all. that the recipients be told clearly that what they are being given is a
technical brief. "
Alvin Weinberg has recently introduced the concept of "trans-science"
(Weinberg 1972):
Many of the questions that lie at the interface between science
and poiit(cs" involve questions that ce.n be stated in scientific terms but
that are in principle beyond the ｰ ｾ ｯ ｦ ｩ ｣ ｩ ･ ｲ Ｎ ｣ ｹ of science ｴ ｾ answer I
[have] proposed the term trans-scientific for such questions For
example. the biological effect on humans of very low level radiation ...
will probably -never be fully· ascertained. simply because- [ofrtlle-huge -
number of animals reqUired to demonstrate an uneqUivocal effect ...
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Scientific truth is established by the traditional methods of peer
review: only what has value in the intellectual marketplace survives.
By contrast, where trans-science is involved. wisdom (rather than
truth) must be arrived at by some other mechanisms ...
Society faces many problems involving trans-scientific components, as
Weinberg points out, and the experienced systems analyst has not infrequently
had to wrestle with how to handle such components in his work, as well as how to
report on them.
These considerations led me some time ago to these conclusions for scien-
tists (Miser 1973), equally applicable to systems analysts:
1. The objective scientific opinion-as I have defined it-is the
best tool for most situations, be they consultations or studies related
--to possible courses of action. participation in adversary proceedings, .
or involvement in trans-scientific debate. In this last category, they
can play the fundamentally important roles of defining what is known
and what is not, estimating the uncertainties of possible projections,
mapping the boundary between science and trans-science, and clarify-
ing the central issues.
2. The role one is playing should be clear; if it is the scientist's
role, the norms for this role should be so scrupulously observed as to
be obvious; if it is the advocate's rob::!, then the technical brief should-
make this disclaimer forcefully clear. both when the debate is an
adversary one and when it deals with trc::.ns-scientific issues.
3. While all agree that the scientist is a citizen, and car:. partici-
pate freely in advocacy and rough and tumble debate. nevertheless
society will never allow t-Jrn to divest himself completely of his respon-
sibility as a scientist, and will, fairly or unfairly. allow its judgement of
his behaviour in these roles to reflect on his dignity as a scientist, and
even on the dignJly of all scientists. The ma.n who would enjoy t.he free-
dom and pleasure of science lTlust pay the tax for this 5imple fact of
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life, some of it incurred by his own conduct, some by the conduct of
colleagues over whom he has no control.
4. Thus, it is in the long-term best interests of all. of science
and for the scientific community as a whole. to try to evolve standards
of proper ｰ ｲ ｡ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｾ ･ for giving advice and advocating public courses of
action and for participating in trans-scientific debate. The price of
failure could well be a significantly reduced confidence in, and support
for. all of science.
• The need for standards of professional behavior, The last conclusion just
stated about the need for standards of professional behavior for systems
analysis work. ipso facto aimed at decisions and policies affecting the public
interest, is only part of a much wider recognition by the science and technology
communities (Chalk, Frankel, and Chafer 1980). While some of these communi-
ties have made considerable progress. others, including systems analysts. have
scarcely begun to think seriously about this matter. However. it is clear that
this is one of the important professional issues facing the community of systems
analysts today, So far. society has been willing for this community to undertake
to regulate itself; however. if it postpones rising to this responsibility for too
long. society could well impose regulation from without.
This view raises the question of what the content of such regulation should
be-on which'there is no agreement presently. It could consist of some princi-
ples governing the internal behavior of systems analysts (such as many that are
discussed in this Handbook), or it coule. deal with the relations of the profession
to society, or perhaps it. could contain elerner.ts of both. Dror (1971) has sug-
gested a challenging set of principles to govern the analyst's relations "With his
client (although "n-itlen in the language of policy science, it can be understood
to apply to the vi.rtually synor:ymous systems analysis):
a. A policy ｳ ｣ ｩ ｾ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｳ ｴ should not work for a client whose goals
and' values', --in' the-opinion 'of the policy s:;:ientist, contrc.dict basfc'
values of democracy and human rights.
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b. When the goals and values of a particular client contradict
basic beliefs of the policy scientist. the policy scientist should resign
rather than help in the realization of goals and values with which he
intensely and fundamentally disagrees.
c. The purpose of policy sciences is to help in better policymak-
ing. and not to displace legitimate policymakers and decisionmakers
with policy scientists who become "gray eminences." Therefore. policy
scientists shall try to preserve and increase the choice opportunities
for their clientele. e.g. by always presenting a number of alternatives.
In particular. a policy scientist should not hide an alternative because
it contradicts his own personal values and preferences.
d. Policy scientists should explicate assumptions and should
present clear value sensitivity analyses. so as further to increase the
judgment opportunities for their clientele.
e. A policy scientist should refuse to prepare studies. the sole
purpose of which is to provide a supporting brief to an alternative
already finally decided upon for other reasons and considerations by
his client.
f. Policy scientists should not work for clients who do not pro-
vide necessary access to information and opportuni.ties for presenta-
tion of studies and their findings.
g. All forms of conflict of interest should be avoided, including
utilization of information for private purposes and presentation of
recommendations in respect to subject matters in which a policy
scientist has a personal and private interest.
However, the experienced analyst will recognize qUickly that a code cannot
be applied to real situations in simple black-and-white terms. Suppose. for
example, that an analyst has completed a major study as a member of a large
bureaucratic staff with the support and cooperation of many members of this
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staff, only to find that the superiors ignore his findings and decide on a course
not recommended for reasons that are offensive to the analyst's principles.
Under Dror's second ethical principal, should the analyst resign, thus honoring
his principles but depriving himself of any chance of effective further influence?
Or should he continue in his post, recognizing that, in any large bureaucracy.
persistent effort may well effect ultimate change in its direction? Meltsner
(1976), who has studied the experience of systems analysts in large US federal
government establishments, says that
o 0 0 Persistence does pay, but evidently it is the quality of the per-
sistence that counts. Unfortunately, the quality that is desired is hard
to capture in words, but I do know policy analysts who have acquired it.
o •• Staying in the bureaucracy and learning from it can enhance the
__ value of persistence.
There is no simple answer to these questions. Rather, the analyst. using his
personal outlooks, knowledge of the situation and its future possibilities, and
perhaps taking account of the advice of more experienced analysts, must him-
self work out the answer most sc.tisfying to him.
There is little help here, however, for the fledgling analysts, who, as Melts-
ner (1976) says:
o •• After their liberal education and professional training, analysts
generally start off their careers with a respect for data, norms of open-
ness, objectivity, and full disclosure and with a sense of loyalty to the
client.
What the professional of systems analysis is saying to the bzginner is that it can-
not yet hand him a code of ethics and good pl'actice as a comprehensive guide,
and that he must rely to some extent on his own background of ethical training
to guide him as he works out ｳ ｯ ｬ ｵ ｴ ｾ ｯ ｮ ｳ to these diiemmas for himself. However,
it can offer him the challenge of contributing constructively to the common
experience of the profession that will lead to an appropriate code of etfl..ics and
good practic e, together with a body of experience to illuminate it, that will gUide
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analysts in the future. The scattered beams of light in this Handbook will help
him in meeting this challenge. perhaps, but the major contributions are yet to
be made.
• The systems analyst as citizen. A systems analyst is a citizen, and noth-
ing we have said so far should be construed as limiting his rights to exercise the
roles of a citizen. However. whether he likes it or not, his public behavior can,
and will, reflect on the standing of his colleagues. as my third conclusion above
brings out.
The nub of the matter has been put well by Don K. Price (1978):
Scientists are citizens too, and ought to be encouraged to partici-
pate fully in politics. to which they may make a unique contribution as
long as they make clear the limits of their competence as scientists to
answer unscientific questions.
15. CONCLUSION
Throughout this Handbook we have been at pains to be not only descriptive
and illustrative but also, wherever possible, prescriptive and normative when-
ever the state of the systems analysis art allows us to do so. However, the
reader must not carry away the impression that the field has a rigidly
prescribed paradigm. either overall or in any of its parts, that must be followed
if the work is to be judged by systems analysts as correct and of high quality.
Rather. the problem and what is appropriate to it must rule. What is presented
here is much of the available menu of possibilities; in the face of the problem
situation the analyst must exercise his judgment in choosing what is effective.
The worst pitfall of all would be to adhere slavtshly to a preconceived outline of
work or arbitrarily restricted menu of technical choices.
The material presented in this Handbook oHers a varied set of possibilities
and examples, pointing to challenging directicns in which the systems analysis
profession may go. This ｜ ｾ ･ ｷ of where the profession is now provides a basis for
its continued growth i.n scope and effectiveness.
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